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Traditionally, vertical integration has concerned industrial 
economists only insofar as it aﬀects market outcomes, par- 
ticularly prices. This paper considers reverse causality, from 
prices – and more generally, from demand – to integration in 
a model of a dynamic oligopoly. If integration is costly but en- 
hances productive eﬃciency, then a trend of rising prices and 
increasing integration could be due to growing demand, in 
which case a divorcement policy of forced divestiture may be 
counterproductive. Divorcement can only help consumers if it 
undermines collusion, but then there are dominating policies. 
We discuss well-known divorcement episodes in retail gaso- 
line and British beer, as well as other evidence, in light of the 
model. 
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 1. Introduction 
A regulator observes that the ﬁrms in an industry he suspects of being imperfectly 
competitive have been vertically integrating over time. Armed with the traditional tools 
of industrial economics, he reckons that either integration is occurring because it enhances 
the productive or allocative eﬃciency of the ﬁrms in the industry, or because the ﬁrms are
attempting to enhance their market power. Eﬃciency gains can arise because integration 
or vertical restraints help the vertical chain to internalize some externalities (e.g., double 
marginalization or free riding by distributors), in which case prices ought to fall. Market
power enhancement could be due to foreclosure (increase rivals’ costs, refusal to supply) 
or to increased ability for vertical chains to collude; either way, prices should rise either at
the wholesale or retail level. 1 Hence, theory suggests that integration may lead to higher
or lower prices depending on whether the dominant eﬀect is foreclosure or eﬃciency. 
Telling the diﬀerence is straightforward: if prices are falling with integration, eﬃciency 
eﬀects predominate. If they are rising, likely the ﬁrms are succeeding in enhancing their
market power. 
In the case of decreasing prices, the regulator, whose main constituency is consumers, 
has little reason to be concerned. In the other case, though, the regulator might be
tempted to invoke a divorcement policy in order to limit the apparent eﬀects of integra-
tion, either by intervening in the control structure of the production chain (for instance
by ordering franchise gasoline retailers rather than their supplying reﬁners to make pric- 
ing decisions) or, more drastically, by ordering asset divestitures (as in the forced sale of
pubs by the brewers that own and supply them). 2 Being a practical person mainly in-
terested in eﬀective policy implementation, the regulator is not apt to ask the seemingly 
academic question of why integration has increased recently rather than some time in 
the distant past; the issue is how to act given the rise in prices. (In the case of falling
prices, the regulator might take reasonable comfort in chalking it up to changes in the
technology of production or distribution.) 
But as is often the case, there are dangers in avoiding the academic questions. Indeed,
in oft-studied cases in US retail gasoline and British beer, regulators imposed divorcement 
policies following long periods of increasing integration and rising prices. What ensued 1 See e.g., Lafontaine and Slade (2007) ; Rey and Tirole (1997) ; Riordan (2005) . On balance, the empirical 
literature tends to provide support for the eﬃciency eﬀect of vertical integration or vertical restraints 
( Co op er et al., 2005; Lafontaine and Slade, 2008 ). 
2 The terms dissolution, divestiture and divorcement are often used interchangeably. The following excerpt 
from Oppenheim (1948) – cited in Adams (1951) – clariﬁes usage: “divestiture refers to situations where the 
defendants are required to divest themselves of property, securities or other assets. Divorcement is [...] used 
to indicate the eﬀect of a decree where certain types of divestiture are ordered. It is especially applicable to 
cases where the purpose of the proceeding is to secure relief against anti-trust abuses ﬂowing from [vertically] 
integrated ownership and control. The term ‘dissolution’ is generally used to refer to any situation where the 
dissolving of an allegedly illegal combination or association is involved, including the use of divestiture and 
divorcement as methods of achieving that end. While the foregoing deﬁnitions diﬀerentiate three aspects 
of remedies, the terms are frequently used interchangeably without any technical distinctions in meaning.”
We thank Yossi Spiegel for suggesting this reference. 
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tas a surprising continuation of rising prices instead of the expected fall. What is more,
rms’ proﬁtability fell, despite the price increases. 
Standard industrial economic theories have a hard time explaining these episodes, but
hey make sense in the light of more recent developments in organizational economics,
hich has traditionally been concerned with the causes of integration more than its
onsequences (at least for the market). In a nutshell, the combination of rising prices,
ncreasing integration, and reduced proﬁts with continued rising prices post-divorcement
an all be attributed to eﬃciency eﬀects along with rising demand : in this view, causality
uns from demand to integration, rather than from integration to market outcomes.
he basis for this explanation is very simple. If integration indeed increases productive
ﬃciency – a view that also has several, sometimes competing, sometimes complementary,
oundations in organizational economics – then it follows from maximizing behavior that
emand conditions must inﬂuence the integration decision. For if integration is costly,
s it has to be, else ﬁrms would always integrate to the maximum possible extent, then
he productivity gain it oﬀers is only worth the cost when the extra output produced is
uﬃciently valuable, namely with high demand. If demand is low, the cost of integrating
utweighs the beneﬁt, and the ﬁrm remains non-integrated. 
The inﬂuence of demand on integration is at the heart of a recent paper ( Legros and
ewman, 2013 ), which considers the case of perfect competition, where the logic is most
ransparent. In this case, the role of demand is represented entirely by the price of the
nal product that a perfectly competitive supply chain faces. The gist of the argument
an be made in the following reduced form mo del. Supp ose that a chain’s technology is
epresented by the cost function 
φ( d ) c ( q) + h ( d ) , 
here q is output and c ( q ) is a standard cost function; we assume that there are eventu-
lly diminishing returns to scale so that this chain is not able to serve the entire market
t constant marginal cost. The choice variable d is the d egree or d epth of vertical inte-
ration, for instance, the number of units in the supply chain that belong to a single ﬁrm
ith the rest remaining stand-alone ﬁrms. 3 The function φ( d ) represents how integration
ﬀects productive eﬃciency; h ( d ) represents costs of integration. Examples of the former
nclude improved co ordination ( Hart and Holmström, 2010 ); b etter multitasking incen-
ives ( Holmström and Milgrom, 1991 ); alignment of control and incentives ( Grossman
nd Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990 ); or reductions in the costs of transactions, adap-
ation, or opportunism ( Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1971; 1975 ). In many cases, costs
 ( d ) can be generated by the same factors: incentives over multiple tasks are diﬃcult
o balance, and ceding control often means exchanging one incentive problem for an-
ther, resulting in decisions that are diﬃcult for some parties to achieve given training,3 This is a drastic simpliﬁcation, since combinations of the members of the supply chain into several non- 
ingleton ﬁrms, let alone recombinations across supply chains, are not allowed. But it is enough to make 
he point. 
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 prior investments, or vision. Or they may result from maintaining a communication and 
monitoring infrastructure within the ﬁrm. 4 Assuming that the chain chooses d and q to
maximize its (joint) proﬁts P q − φ( d ) c ( q) − h ( d ) given market price P , a ﬁrst observation
is that P aﬀects the choice of integration level, just as it aﬀects the choice of quantity
pro duced, b ecause it is a parameter of an optimization problem. To be more concrete,
assume that φ( d ) is decreasing and h ( d ) increasing. Then proﬁt is sup ermo dular in the
choices ( d , q ) and has increasing diﬀerences in ( P , q ). As a result, optimal q and therefore
optimal d increase with P : when output is more valuable, and the chain therefore wants
to produce more of it, it is worth investing more in the reduced costs of doing so. 5 
Now consider the policy maker’s conundrum. If demand was increasing over time 
(and not compensated by entry), then price would be rising. This would induce ﬁrms
to integrate more; their costs would be lower and proﬁts (both net and gross of the
integration cost) higher. Each ﬁrm would supply more (but not so much that the industry
price would be reduced to its previous level, else ﬁrms would return to their previous
integration and supply levels leading to excess demand). The new equilibrium price would 
be higher, but rather despite integration than because of it. For if the policy maker forced
ﬁrms to reduce integration to some prior and lower level, their costs would rise, industry
supply would be lower and the price even higher. This outcome is evocative of what
happened in the gasoline and beer episodes that we document in Section 4 . 
Of course, there are important diﬀerences, not least that neither of these industries 
appeared to be prima facie competitive. Extending the perfectly competitive framework 
to an oligopolistic one is the task of this paper. We are not attempting any sort of gener-
ality here, only enough to highlight some of the issues. We consider a model of Cournot
competition among supply chains that can choose the level of vertical integration, which 
reduces their marginal production cost. This is an appropriate setting to address another 
policy concern – expressed for example by policy makers in the British beer case – of
whether and how integration facilitates collusion among these chains, as well how policies 
that regulate how integrated aﬀect industry performance. 
1.1. Summary of ﬁndings 
The ﬁrst observation is that there is a conﬂict of interest between ﬁrms and consumers
concerning the level of integration: as in other eﬃciency models, consumers would like 4 Typically in organizational models, at least part of the costs or beneﬁts of integrating are private, 
unobservable, and in any case non-contractible. Practically speaking this may mean that they will be diﬃcult 
for the empirical investigator or policy maker to observe. In particular a distinction between gross (i.e. 
revenue minus costs of measured inputs) proﬁtability and net proﬁtability (gross proﬁts minus integration 
costs) is worth bearing in mind. 
5 To be sure, in some models, particularly those in which incentives play a role, the extent of the eﬃciency 
gains, or the costs of integrating, may depend on other variables besides d , such as the price P or the 
distribution of the proﬁts among the various production units. For instance in Legros and Newman (2013) , 
both the integration beneﬁt and the integration cost display decreasing diﬀerences in ( d , P ), but the net 
eﬀect is that d is always increasing in P . Other models of ﬁrms may have non-monotonic predictions; indeed, 
the diﬀerences across models could enable market data to serve as a proving ground for organization theory 
( Legros and Newman, 2014 ). 
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lhere to be a high degree of integration, since that tends toward low costs and therefore
ow prices. But from the point of view of the ﬁrms in the market, there is too much
ntegration: each ﬁrm confers a negative externality on its rivals when it integrates,
ecause the cost reduction results in business stealing. In equilibrium, while measured
roﬁts may be substantial due to low marginal production costs, net proﬁts that take
ccount of the cost of integration (but at least in some of the interpretations alluded to
bove would b e diﬃcult to measure), will b e low. 
Second, as in the perfectly competitive case, demand plays a role in determining the
ntegration decisions that ﬁrms make. Increasing demand always increases integration.
ut whether it is accompanied by rising or falling prices depends on which parameter
f the (linear) demand is shifting. Consistent with the model, co-variation of integration
nd price is not always observed: indeed the b eer and gasoline cases app ear somewhat
nusual in the trends that led to the policy responses. 
Third, we can address the question of whether integration serves to facilitate collusion,
hich seems to have been a particular concern for regulators in the British beer case
 Spicer et al., 2012 ). A ﬁrst answer is not at all: as we have suggested, the industry
ot only has a collective motive to restrict output, but also to reduce integration levels.
ndeed, if they are able to sustain collusion through repeated interaction, then they will
hoose a lower integration level than they would in the non-collusive Cournot equilibrium.
n this model, at least, high levels of integration serve as signs of low levels of collusion. 6
But there is a sense in which integration can support collusion. For the punishment
nﬂicted on a deviator from a collusive strategy proﬁle in which low levels of integration
nd output are being sustained is to revert to the higher integration and output levels of
ournot equilibrium. If integration were exogenous, or at least capped at a low level, this
unishment would not be so severe, and collusion more diﬃcult to sustain. By threatening
he very low Cournot payoﬀs that integration aﬀords, it is the possibility, rather than
he reality, of more integration that helps sustain collusion. 
Our fourth ﬁnding concerns the eﬀects of divorcement p olicy, mo deled as a binding
ap on integration that is below the current level, and therefore requires divestment
f assets. It follows from the over-investment result that if the industry is in the non-
ollusive equilibrium, then divorcement typically helps ﬁrms. Consumers are not helped
y this, of course, because marginal costs and therefore prices rise. 
If, however, the industry was colluding before the divorcement policy implementation,
hen two things can happen. Either collusion continues anyway, in which case consumers
re harmed relative to the pre-divorcement outcome because marginal costs have in-
reased, or it is undermined, because the Cournot payoﬀ is now relatively high and does
ot constitute an adequate threat against deviation. This provides a potential beneﬁt
o consumers that would in general have to be weighed against the increase in marginal6 To be sure, a collusive industry that experiences rising demand would increase its level of integration, 
ust as a monopolist would. But a non-collusive industry would do the same, and would always have higher 
evels of integration than the collusive one. 
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 costs resulting from ineﬃcient organization. However, as discussed in the ﬁnal section of 
the paper, which considers the gasoline and beer divorcement episodes in more depth, 
it does not appear in either case that the trade-oﬀ between collusion and organizational 
ineﬃciency was managed to consumers’ beneﬁt. 
This is not to say that leaving industries unregulated is optimal. We discuss more
general integration regulations that place caps on integration that need not force ﬁrms 
to divest. These may still destabilize collusion by increasing the Cournot payoﬀ, but 
would have less detrimental eﬀects on costs in case they do not. 7 
1.2. Links to the literature 
Our model is similar to models of investment in cost reduction, where the reduction
in the marginal cost of production comes at the expense of a higher ﬁxed cost (see Vives,
2008 for a recent survey), and in a static world, there would be indeed very little diﬀerence
in interpreting d as an investment in process innovation or degree of integration. The
diﬀerence of interpretation is important when we consider dynamics and collusion since 
we will assume that the cost reduction is temporary and therefore reversible: ﬁrms can
choose the level of integration each p erio d. This assumption of reversibility would be hard
to rationalize in a model where the cost reduction is due to innovation. The assumption is
natural, however, in an organizational context since ﬁrms can divest assets, or integrate 
more assets each p erio d. 8 
The choice of d aﬀects the ability of ﬁrms to compete, since it modiﬁes the marginal
cost, but does not modify the demand for the product. If d could also modify the quality
of the products, there would be a demand eﬀect, as in Sutton (1991) , with the important
caveat that the cost h ( d ) is not sunk but ﬁxed. 
There is surprisingly little literature on tacit collusion when ﬁrms make investments 
that aﬀect costs (or demand) before competition on the product market. An exception is
Nocke (2007) which considers collusion in a sunk cost industry; investments permanently 
modify the demand for the products. This is not the case in our world since integration
decisions are reversible. See also Schinkel and Spiegel (2016) in this volume. 
Our results help us understand the role that organizational design can play in tacit 
collusion, and highlight that there may be costs and few beneﬁts of forcing ﬁrms to divest
even after observing covariation of prices and integration. They should not, of course, 
be interpreted as implying that divestment and other forms of integration regulation are 
never desirable. For instance when vertical integration may lead to input foreclosure, 
divestitures may b e pro-comp etitive ( Sibley and Weisman, 1998; Vickers, 1985 ). But
policy makers ought to be aware that upward trending prices and proﬁts in the wake of7 The possibility that regulation may enhance welfare by limiting collusion through restrictions that only 
bind oﬀ the equilibrium path has been observed in other contexts; see Chassang and Ortner (2015) . 
8 Clearly, transaction costs in the market for trading assets will limit reversibility; something we ignore here 
but would be relevant in a general analysis. The assumption we make is in line with organizational theories 
such as the “property rights” literature, which emphasize the private and incentive costs of relinquishing 
control rights under integration. 
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b  ntegration need not be the result of foreclosure. As has been noted in other contexts,
aution must be exercised in the design of policies that regulate vertical relationships
 Cremer et al., 2007; Fiocco, 2011; Höﬄer and Kranz, 2011; Karl and Legros, 2015 ). 
. A model of integration 
We consider an industry populated by vertical supply chains that are isolated from
ach other except at the ﬁnal downstream stage, where they sell in a common market.
ntermediate go o ds along the supply chain have no market. This portrait of the industry is
ainly for simplicity, but it is also in the spirit of much of the organization literature that
mphasizes “relationship speciﬁcity.” An example would be coal-ﬁred electric generating
tation located next to a coal mine: coal is costly to transport and low in value, so the
ine’s market is limited primarily to the power plant, but the electricity can be sold in
 national market via the power grid. Our reduced form model is consistent with richer
heories of integration, e.g., Legros and Newman (2013) . 
The timing of the model is as follows: 
• There are n downstream producers indexed by i or j , and each makes a decision d to
integrate with suppliers (we do not consider horizontal integration). 
• Integration decisions are observed and ﬁrms choose the quantity to produce. 
• The product market clears, that is if Q is the total quantity produced by the ﬁrms the
price on the market is P ( Q ) := a − Q, the price equal to value of the inverse demand
function at Q , where a > 0. 
If the degree of integration in a ﬁrm is d ∈ [0 , d ] , and the quantity produced is q , the
ost borne by the ﬁrm is C ( q ; d ), where to simplify the analysis we use the following
peciﬁcation: 
C( q; d ) := ( c − d ) q + d 2 . 
o insure an interior solution in the choice of integration in the Cournot game, we assume
hat c is not too small with respect to a : 
c < a < 
( n + 1) 2 
n 
c. (1)
he cost d 2 is best thought of as “ﬁxed” and independent of output or price. Firms make
 decision on the degree of integration d and the higher d is the larger are the ﬁxed cost
 
2 and the reduction of marginal cost c − d . The key feature of our speciﬁcation for our
esults is that the cost function has negative cross partials in d , q , that is the marginal
ost of production is a decreasing function of the degree of integration. 
.1. Cournot equilibrium 
We consider subgame perfect equilibria in integration decisions { d i }, which are followed
y integration-contingent quantity decisions { q i }. Output choices are contingent on thePlease cite this article as: P. Legros, A.F. Newman, Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy, 
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 choices of integration by all ﬁrms in the industry because the marginal costs of ﬁrms are
aﬀected by these organizational choices. 
For a given proﬁle of integration decisions d := ( d 1 , . . . , d n ) , the continuation game
is a standard Cournot game with marginal costs { c − d i , i = 1 , . . . , n } . Therefore the
quantities, price, and proﬁt levels are (sums are over j = 1 , . . . , n inclusive of i unless
otherwise noted): 
q ∗i ( d ) = 
a − c −∑ j d j + ( n + 1) d i 
n + 1 , Q 
∗( d ) = 
n ( a − c ) + ∑ j d j 
n + 1 , 
P ( Q ∗( d )) = 
a + nc −∑ j d j 
n + 1 . 
The equilibrium Cournot proﬁt (gross proﬁt less the ﬁxed integration cost d 2 i ) is: 
π∗i ( d ) = 
(
a − c −∑ j d j + ( n + 1) d i 
)2 
( n + 1) 2 − d 
2 
i . (2) 
Note that the organizational choices are strategic substitutes in the ﬁrst stage since π∗i ( d )
has negative cross partials in ( d i , d j ). Hence if ﬁrm i expects other ﬁrms to integrate less,
it will integrate more. 
When ﬁrms choose their integration structure, they anticipate the equilibrium proﬁt 
function ( 2 ). Because the marginal gross proﬁt is 2 n ( n +1) 2 ( a − c −
∑ 
j d j ) + 
2 nd i 
n +1 , as long
as a − c is positive, some ﬁrms will cho ose p ositive integration in equilibrium because
the marginal ﬁxed cost is equal to zero when d = 0 . Equilibrium is characterized by a
non-singular linear system, for which the unique solution is symmetric: 
d ∗ = n ( a − c ) 
n 2 + n + 1 ; (3) 
assumption (1) ensures that d ∗ < c . 
Lemma 1. Under assumption (1) , there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Each
ﬁrm chooses a degree of integration 
d ∗ = n ( a − c ) 
n 2 + n + 1 , 
produces q ∗ = n +1 n 2 + n +1 ( a − c ) and the industry market price is P ∗ = a + n ( n +1) c n 2 + n +1 . 
The integration decision by an individual ﬁrm imposes an externality on the others. 
To see this, consider Π∗( d ), the per-ﬁrm proﬁt when all ﬁrms use the same degree of
integration d and then play Cournot: 
Π∗( d ) = ( a − c + d ) 
2 
( n + 1) 2 − d 
2 . (4) Please cite this article as: P. Legros, A.F. Newman, Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy, 
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e “Cournot planner” who chooses the (common) level of integration d P for each chain,
ssuming they go on to play Cournot equilibrium in quantities, regards the marginal
eneﬁt of integration as 2( a −c + d 
P ) 
( n +1) 2 , and equates this to the marginal cost of integration
 
P : 
d P = a − c 
n ( n + 2) . 
ut from ( 2 ), each ﬁrm regards the marginal beneﬁt as n times larger, because a cost
eduction not only expands the market for the industry, but increases the market share
f that ﬁrm. This business-stealing eﬀect implies that Cournot competitors over-invest in
ntegration (from their point of view, of course – consumers would not agree), which is an
dditional motive over and above the usual output restriction motive for collusion. The
usiness-stealing eﬀect is especially severe in our speciﬁcation, as simple algebra shows
hat Π∗(0) > Π∗( d ∗). Other properties of the function Π∗( d ∗) are summarized here, as
hey will be useful later. 
roposition 1. Cournot-competing supply chains over-invest in integration in equilibrium:
he net proﬁt Π∗( d ) they obtain when integrating at a common level d is a strictly concave
unction on [0, d ∗] with interior maximum at d P < d ∗ and minimum at d ∗. 
.2. Collusive outcome 
We think of collusion as sustained in a repeated game with common discount factor
, where ﬁrms choose integration as well as quantity decisions ( d i , q i ) every p erio d, since
hey are both reversible and costly for as long as the supply chain is operating. We will
ssume that collusion leads to the maximum per-ﬁrm proﬁt absent side-payments. That
s, we assume that ﬁrms collude on 
( d M , q M ) := arg max 
d,q 
( a − nq − c + d ) q − d 2 , 
he two ﬁrst order conditions are q = a −c + d 2 n and q = 2 d, implying that 
d M = a − c 4 n − 1 , q 
M = 2( a − c ) 4 n − 1 , P 
M = 2 n − 1 4 n − 1 a + 
2 n 
4 n − 1 c, (5)
nd the maximum collusive proﬁt is 
ΠM ( d M ) := ( a − c + d 
M ) 2 
4 n − ( d 
M ) 2 = ( a − c ) 
2 
4 n − 1 . 
bserve that d M > d P : the reason is that marginal returns to integrating under monopoly
xceed those of the Cournot planner by a factor ( n +1) 
2 
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 The repeated game in ( d M , q M ) is somewhat non-standard, since the stage game is
itself dynamic: ﬁrms choose integration ﬁrst and then, upon observing the integration 
structure in the industry, choose their quantities. For this reason we are explicit in the
way the trigger strategy is deﬁned. 
• At time 1, 
• Each ﬁrm i chooses d i . 
• If for each i , d i = d M , ﬁrms play q i = q M . 
• If for some i , d i  = d M , ﬁrms play the Cournot equilibrium action q i ( d ). 
• For time t ≥ 2, deﬁne a history to be collusive if at each previous period, every ﬁrm
chose ( d M , q M ); otherwise the history is non-collusive. 
• If the history is collusive, play d M . Once d is observed play q M if d i = d M for each
i ; otherwise play the Cournot quantity q ∗i ( d ) . 
• If the history is non-collusive, play d i = d ∗. For each observed d play the Cournot
quantity q ∗i ( d ) . 
There are two incentive compatibility conditions: ﬁrst, a ﬁrm must not want to change
its organization (degree of integration) to d i  = d M and immediately face the Cournot
proﬁts π∗i ( d M e −i , d i ) and, second, a ﬁrm must not want to change its output given
( d M e , q M e −i ) . Here e is a vector of 1’s; the notation x e ( x e −i ) denotes that all ﬁrms (all
ﬁrms but i ) are playing the same action x . 
Let Πdev d ( ˆ  d ) := max d πi ( ˆ  d e −i , d ) = max d { ( a −c −( n −1) ˆ
 d + nd ) 2 
( n +1) 2 −d 
2 } be the maximum proﬁt
within a p erio d a ﬁrm could have by deviating to d  = ˆ d and facing immediate Cournot
competition when all other ﬁrms choose ˆ d . From the remark following Eq. (2) about
the strategic substitutability of the integration decisions, the optimal deviation if ˆ d < d ∗
exceeds d ∗ and therefore ˆ d . 
Let Πdev q ( ˆ  d ) := max q ( a − c + ˆ d − ( n − 1) ˆ  q − q) q − ˆ d 2 be the maximum proﬁt within a
p erio d a ﬁrm can achieve by integrating to the level ˆ d but subsequently deviating in
quantity from the collusive quantity ˆ q chosen by the other ﬁrms. (The notation reﬂects 
that the deviation proﬁt only depends on ˆ d , because we always take ˆ q to be the optimal
monopoly quantity given the integration level ˆ d .) 
When a ﬁrm deviates upward from ˆ d = d M , it gains a competitive advantage due to
a lower marginal cost, but this beneﬁt is signiﬁcantly reduced not only by the additional
ﬁxed cost, but also by an immediate change of conduct by the other ﬁrms: following
this deviation in integration, ﬁrms will immediately shift to Cournot play, so that the
cost reduction beneﬁt is obtained only over the relatively small Cournot quantity. By 
contrast, by going along with the collusive integration decision d M , a ﬁrm can deviate
in quantity, temporarily gaining a large share of the market, while facing only a delayed
punishment by the other ﬁrms. Indeed, explicit computation of the values of the deviation 
proﬁts deﬁned above reveals that deviating in quantity while b eing ob edient in integrationPlease cite this article as: P. Legros, A.F. Newman, Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy, 
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c  rings a higher gain than deviating in integration: 
Πdev d ( d M ) ≤
9 n 2 
(2 n + 1)(4 n − 1) 2 ( a − c ) 
2 (6)
Πdev q ( d M ) = 
n ( n + 2) 
(4 n − 1) 2 ( a − c ) 
2 . (7)
In (6) , the right hand side is computed for an interior solution, which is not guaranteed
y (1) ; the inequality allows for the possibility that the optimal deviation is at a corner.)
ecause Πdev q ( d M ) > Πdev d ( d M ) and following either type of deviation ﬁrms play ( d ∗,
 
∗) in all subsequent p erio ds, the binding incentive constraint is the one for quantity
eviation. 
emma 2. The maximum proﬁt a ﬁrm can obtain when deviating is Πdev q ( d M ) . 
In equilibrium, ﬁrms produce q M = a −c + d M 2 n , and therefore the best deviation from this
utput is the one that achieves Πdev q ( d M ) . There is an incentive to deviate if ΠM ( d M ) <
1 − δ)Πdev q ( d M ) + δΠ∗( d ∗) , that is when: 
δ < δno ( d M , d ∗) := 
Πdev q ( d M ) − ΠM ( d M ) 
Πdev q ( d M ) − Π∗( d ∗) 
, (8)
here we make explicit the fact that the cutoﬀ discount factor depends on the integration
evel chosen under collusion and under Cournot behavior. It is straightforward to check
hat the critical discount factor δno ( d M , d ) is decreasing in its second argument for d >
 
P (since Π∗( d ) is decreasing in that range). This property of the critical discount factor
lays a key role in our analysis of policy in the next section. 
. Demand changes and divorcement policy 
Inspection of the outcomes under Cournot and collusion ( Lemma 1 and expression
5) ) shows that when ﬁrms do not expect to collude, they will integrate more: d ∗ =
n ( a −c ) 
n 2 + n +1 > d 
M = a −c 4 n −1 for n > 1. In addition to this level eﬀect on integration, ﬁrms’
onduct modiﬁes how sensitive integration is to demand shocks, and Cournot behavior
eads to larger changes in integration than collusive behavior since dd ∗da > 
dd M 
da . 
However, while increases in a result in higher integration levels, they generate two
pposite forces on prices. By themselves, these demand shifts would increase price. But
here is a countervailing eﬀect brought on by the induced reduction in marginal cost. Nev-
rtheless, it is clear from the equilibrium values in Lemma 1 and expression (5) that the
emand eﬀect dominates, and the prices under Cournot competition and under collusion
o monopoly are both increasing in a – the variation is 1 n 2 + n +1 for Cournot and 
2 n −1 
4 n −1 for
ollusion (thus, opposite integration, price is more responsive under collusion than underPlease cite this article as: P. Legros, A.F. Newman, Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy, 
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 Cournot). Because integration also increases when a increases, we have a co-variation 
between price level and integration. Notice that in the standard model with exogenous 
marginal cost, the variation in price due to a would be larger than it is here: 1 n +1 in the
Cournot case, 1 2 under collusion. Thus price increases in our model are not caused by
integration at all, and indeed because of it are smaller than they would otherwise be. 
Proposition 2. 
(i) Rising demand in the form of increasing a generates a higher degree of integration, 
both under Cournot and under collusion. 
(ii) Price and integration co-vary in response to changes in a. 
(iii) Integration is more responsive, and price less so, under Cournot than under collu- 
sion. 
Note that in terms of elasticities rather than rates of change, price is more elastic
under monopoly than Cournot, but integration is equally elastic in the two cases. 
If the demand curve is P = a − bQ, the eﬀects of changes in a are as before. But
increases in demand that take the form of reductions in the “market size” parameter b
have somewhat diﬀerent eﬀects. On the one hand, integration increases, as long as in-
terior solutions exist (this requires b > n ( n +1) 2 in the case of Cournot and b > 
1 
4 n in the
case of collusion). On the other hand, in neither case does price increase when b falls:
if integration were held ﬁxed, the fall in b would not lead to a price change (as in the
standard model with linear demand and constant marginal costs), but since integration 
does increase, costs fall, and therefore both the monopoly and Cournot prices fall in
equilibrium. Thus changing demand does not always generate co-variation in price and 
integration. Of course, neither is such co-variation universally observed. It is the pos- 
sibility of such co-variation under demand-driven integration that we are pointing out 
here. 
To simplify the remainder of the exposition, we assume that there is a one-time demand
shift in the form of an increase in a . 9 We also assume there is no change in conduct
following the demand increase. 10 Let us assume that upon observing this joint increase 
in price and integration, the regulator puts more weight on the potential foreclosure 
eﬀect of integration than on its eﬃciency beneﬁts, and decides to regulate the industry
by preventing any integration above some level d r that we always take to be less than
d ∗ (else the policy has no bite). In other words, the regulator believes that the causal
relationship ﬂows from integration to prices. 9 A full analysis of collusion under general shifts in demand, b o oms or busts, in the context of a two stage 
static game like ours is beyond the scope of this paper. See for instance Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and 
Kandori (1991) for an analysis of repeated games with variable demand when there is a one-dimensional 
strategic variable. 
10 One can check that, as each of the three net proﬁt expressions in Eq. (8) are expressible as functions of 
n times ( a − c ) 2 , δno ( d M , d ∗) is independent of a . Thus increasing demand has no impact on the feasibility 
of collusion. 
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wWe will ﬁrst consider how the regulation aﬀects play assuming there is no change in
onduct (i.e., collusion or Cournot). Using these observations, we derive how the critical
iscount factor δno ( ·, ·) is aﬀected by policy, which allows us to determine whether there
an be a change of conduct. Finally, we put these pieces together to assess the eﬀects of
ivorcement and other policies that regulate the degree of integration. 
Suppose ﬁrst that ﬁrms play Cournot before and after the policy. Since d r < d ∗, they
re constrained to play d i ≤ d r , and will all choose d r in equilibrium: since integration
trategies are substitutes, when the other ﬁrms are constrained to choose d j ≤ d r , ﬁrm
 will want to choose d i > d ∗ but is also constrained and therefore chooses d r . The net
ournot proﬁt is Π∗( d r ), which by Proposition 1 exceeds Π∗( d ∗). In eﬀect, the regulation
oves in the direction the Cournot planner would want by helping to limit the eﬀects of
he business-stealing externality. 
If ﬁrms are colluding before and after regulation, the policy has diﬀering eﬀects de-
ending on whether d r is smaller than d M . If d r ≥ d M , the p olicy do es not bind on what
he ﬁrms do in equilibrium, but does bind on what they can achieve oﬀ the equilibrium
ath: the permanent Cournot punishment for quantity deviation now yields a payoﬀ of
∗( d r ) > Π∗( d ∗). However, colluding ﬁrms can still try to play d M in equilibrium, and the
unishment within the p erio d of playing Cournot at costs c − d M is unchanged, while the
ain, which is now constrained by d ≤ d r , cannot be larger than before the regulation. On
he other hand, the one-shot gain from deviating in quantity while integrating at d M is
naﬀected by the policy: Lemma 2 still holds in this case, and as before, the no-quantity
eviation constraint is the one that binds. 
If the policy is more severe, with d r < d M , then ﬁrms are constrained in the levels
f integration they can maintain on path as well as oﬀ. Since the integration proﬁt is
oncave in d , the cartel will wish to collude on d r . The maximum proﬁt level under
ollusion and the maximal quantity deviation proﬁt are: 
ΠM ( d r ) = ( a − c + d 
r ) 2 
4 n − ( d 
r ) 2 ; Πdev q ( d r ) = 
( n + 1) 2 
16 n 2 ( a − c + d 
r ) 2 − ( d r ) 2 . (9)
s in the unregulated case, there are two incentive compatibility conditions for stability,
nd again the condition with respect to deviations from d r can be sustained within a
 erio d by the threat of immediate reversion to Cournot play. 11 As before, then, it is the
uantity deviation incentive compatibility condition that binds. 11 To see this, let d ∗( d r ) := arg max d πi ( d r e , d ) denote the unconstrained optimal deviation for i when the 
ther ﬁrms play d r . Since d r < d M , strategic substitutability of the objective implies d ∗( d r ) > d ∗( d M ) > d M , 
here the second inequality was shown earlier in the discussion leading to Lemma 2 . Concavity of πi ( d r e , d ) 
n d then implies that the objective is increasing on [0, d ∗( d r )], so the solution to the constrained problem 
ith d ≤ d r is d r . Thus the ﬁrm can do no better by deviating than the Cournot planner’s payoﬀ at d r , 
hich is less than the monopoly payoﬀ at d r that it can obtain by sticking to the collusive integration level. 
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 To summarize: 
Lemma 3. Suppose the regulator imposes d r < d ∗. If ﬁrms collude before and after the
policy change, they play d M if d r ≥ d M , and d r if d r < d M . The permanent Cournot
punishment following any deviation leads to a per-period payoﬀ of Π∗( d r ) . 
To determine the eﬀects of the policy on the ability of ﬁrms to collude, we need only
check how it aﬀects the critical discount factor δno ( ·, ·). When d r ≥ d M , the sustained
proﬁt is ΠM ( d M ) and deviation proﬁt is Πdev q ( d M ) . The Cournot proﬁt is Π∗( d ∗). Thus
collusion is sustainable when 
δ ≥ δno ( d M , d r ) = Π
dev 
q ( d M ) − ΠM ( d M ) 
Πdev q ( d M ) − Π∗( d r ) 
, 
which is a decreasing function of d r , since by Proposition 1 , Π∗( d ) is decreasing on ( d P ,
d ∗), which contains ( d M , d ∗). When d r ≤ d M , collusive ﬁrms integrate to the level d r and
the critical discount factor to sustain collusion is 
δno ( d r , d r ) = 
Πdev q ( d r ) − ΠM ( d r ) 
Πdev q ( d r ) − Π∗( d r ) 
. 
From (9) and (4) , this ratio is a constant , equal to δno ( d M , d M ) for any d r ≤ d M ; this
is because ﬁrms always bear the same ﬁxed cost d r 2 whether they collude, deviate or
play Cournot and therefore the numerator and the denominator are proportional to 
( a − c + d r ) 2 . Thus the minimum discount factor that sustains collusion is a continuous,
non-increasing function of d r , constant on [0, d M ], and decreasing on ( d M , d ∗]. 
We are now in position to analyze the eﬀects of policy. There are three cases, depending
on the value of the discount factor δ. For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms collude as long
as their discount factor exceeds the critical level. 
3.1. Low discount factors, δ < δno (d M , d ∗) 
In this case, ﬁrms are unable to sustain collusion before the policy, and since imposing
the policy raises the critical discount factor, they will not collude after. The analysis of
Cournot play applies, and the result is 
• integration falls from d ∗ to d r and marginal costs rise; 
• product price rises – consumers lose; 
• gross proﬁts (revenue less production costs) fall; 
• net proﬁt (gross proﬁt less integration costs) increase – ﬁrms are better oﬀ. 
3.2. High discount factors, δ ≥ δno (d M , d M ) 
Here ﬁrms are able to sustain collusion both before and after the policy, regardless
of how severe it is (how low d r ) and thus the policy itself would have no impact onPlease cite this article as: P. Legros, A.F. Newman, Demand-driven integration and divorcement policy, 
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 onduct. A policy d r ≥ d M would have no impact on market outcomes, but neither is
t meaningfully a divorcement policy, since it does not force ﬁrms to divest any of the
ssets they own. A true divorcement policy has d r < d M , in which case 
• integration falls from d M to d r and marginal costs rise; 
• product price rises – consumers lose; 
• gross proﬁts (revenue less production costs) fall; 
• net proﬁts (gross proﬁt less integration costs) fall – ﬁrms are worse oﬀ. 
.3. Moderate discount factors, δ ∈ ( δno (d M , d ∗), δno (d M , d M )) 
The principle diﬀerence between this case and the two others is the possibility that
he regulations engenders a change of conduct, by raising the critical discount factor
bove the existing one. Let d r ( δ) ∈ ( d M , d ∗), solve δno ( d M , d r ) = δ. Given δ, this is the
inimum level of integration at which collusion is sustainable. If d r ≥ d r ( δ), then collusion
s possible after as well as before the policy change, and the policy has no impact (again,
ince the integration ceiling is above the level that was being sustained in equilibrium,
his policy is not really divorcement). But if d r < d r ( δ), collusion is not possible under
he policy. Integration now goes from d M to d r , and the ﬁrms will deliver the Cournot
uantity given d r . Hence, if d r ∈ ( d M , d r ( δ)) the result is 
• integration rises from d M to d r and marginal costs fall; 
• product price falls – consumers gain 
• gross proﬁts (revenue less production costs) fall; 
• net proﬁts (gross proﬁt less integration costs) fall – ﬁrms are worse oﬀ. 
otice that the change of conduct in this regime is generated by the eﬀect of d r on
ﬀ-path play: there is no constraint on on-path integration levels as long as d r ≥ d M .
ompliance with the policy then does not actually require ﬁrms to sell oﬀ assets. 
A divorcement policy in this case would really amount to setting d r < d M , which is
neﬃcient, because it does no more to change ﬁrms’ conduct than setting d r just under
 
r ( δ), but does force ﬁrms to engage in Cournot competition at higher-than-necessary
osts. To be sure, it still beneﬁts consumers relative to no regulation, because destabilizing
ollusion always lowers the market price in this model. Even if the regulator imposes the
trongest divorcement policy by preventing any integration ( d r = 0 ), the monopoly price
t d M exceeds Cournot price at d r = 0 . But he would do better to cap integration at
bove d M and below d r ( δ): it also destroys collusion but allows a greater degree of cost-
eduction – and therefore a lower Cournot price. 
Combining the three cases, we conclude: 
roposition 3. 
(i) Following divestiture, the price consumers pay decreases if, and only if, the ﬁrms’
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 (ii) Firms beneﬁt from divorcement if and only if they are not colluding. 
(iii) If ﬁrms collude on d M and the conduct of ﬁrms can change with an integration
ceiling, a policy that dominates divorcement limits integration to just under d r ( δ)
∈ ( d M , d ∗) . 
The p olicy describ ed in Prop osition 3 (iii) is near-optimal in d r (the change of con-
duct at d r ( δ) introduces a discontinuity, so an optimum does not exist). It would result
in a shift in conduct from collusion to Cournot and consequently an increase in the level
of integration from d M to d r . We are not aware of any policy episodes resembling this
possibility; note that it requires information on the discount factor δ, which is unlikely 
to be available. There is, however, a policy that economizes on information for the reg-
ulator and will dominate divorcement. This soft policy simply caps integration at the 
existing level rather than forcing divestment: it will break collusion whenever a stricter 
divorcement policy would, is neutral with respect to prices and integration whenever it 
does not, but allows larger cost reductions in case ﬁrms do switch to Cournot. 12 
One thing we have not considered so far is the eﬀects of divorcement on exit, and while
a full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper, we make some observations. If ﬁrms
incur an additional ﬁxed cost to operate, then a fall in net proﬁts following divorcement
may lead some to exit. There is evidence this happened in the British beer case. Exit may
not be harmful of course if ﬁrms were making monopoly proﬁts prior to the regulation.
But if they were not colluding, the regulation will force costs to be higher, and after
exit, the smaller number of ﬁrms combined with higher costs will drive prices up even
further. What is more, with fewer ﬁrms left, collusion may be more sustainable than
before, raising the possibility that divorcement might facilitate collusion. 
4. Some evidence for demand-driven integration 
Evidence for the eﬀects of demand on integration is starting to be collected. Some
suggestive evidence comes from some single-industry studies (e.g. Forbes and Lederman, 
2010 ), which shows that airlines are more apt to integrate with regional carriers on more
“valuable” routes (speciﬁcally those where failures are more costly); Forbes and Lederman 
(2009) also show that integrated relationships are more productive, which bolsters the 
key assumption in this paper. 
A few papers try systematically to test for demand eﬀects on integration by focusing
on ostensibly competitive industries wherein the inﬂuence of demand would manifest 
itself through the price level. An empirical challenge is to ﬁnd exogenous sources of
price variation and look for correlation with integration. One approach is provided in 
Alfaro et al. (2016) , which uses variation in the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariﬀs 12 If ﬁrms are not colluding, the regulator caps integration at what is actually d ∗, (though he does not 
know this), which has no impact. If ﬁrms are colluding, then he is capping at d M ; either this has no impact 
because we are in the high discount factor case, or it breaks collusion and ﬁrms will maintain the current 
cost c − d M . 
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S  pplied by GATT/WTO members as a proxy for price variation. The idea is that tar-
ﬀs aﬀect prices, and through that integration, but (vertical) integration is unlikely to
ﬀect tariﬀs. The argument for exogeneity of MFN tariﬀs comes partly from the insti-
utional structure by which they are set: long rounds of multilateral bargaining and a
on-discrimination principle that forces uniform application of tariﬀs to all trading part-
ers makes the MFN tariﬀs much more resistant to lobbying than other forms of trade
arriers. Because tariﬀs raise product prices in the domestic market (as compared to the
orld price), reverse causality suggests that they should lead to more integration among
rms selling in that market. 
Alfaro et al. (2016) deﬁnes the degree of integration to be the fraction of inputs
in value-added terms) that are produced within the ﬁrm (this measure is due to Fan
nd Lang, 2000 ); in the data, the average is about 6%, though there is considerable
ariation across as well as within (4-digit SIC) industries. Tariﬀs should have stronger
ﬀects on ﬁrms that do not sell abroad, since exporters face the world price, not the
ust the domestic one. Focusing on this diﬀerential eﬀect of tariﬀs on domestic ﬁrms and
xporters, and using country-sector ﬁxed eﬀects to control for possible omitted variables
hat might be driving integration and tariﬀs, the paper reports strong eﬀect of tariﬀs on
he degree of integration. The estimated tariﬀ elasticity of vertical integration is in the
ange 0.02–0.09, which, since tariﬀs average around 5%, translates into a price elasticity
n the range 0.4–2. 
An example of a single-industry study that tries to identify price eﬀects on vertical
ntegration is McGowan (2015) , which looks at changes in the vertical structure of U.S.
oal processing plants and the mines that supply them. The Staggers Railroad Act of 1980
eregulated railroad pricing; greater competition among railroads led to falling shipping
osts, which enabled electric power plants, particularly in the East, to proﬁtably source
oal from anywhere in the country. Cheap coal from the Powder River Basin in Montana
nd Wyoming was now able to compete with Eastern coal among Eastern power plants,
educing coal prices there. However, in the West, there was little change in shipping
osts, mainly due to the relative sparseness of rail networks. As our model hypothesizes,
he data reveal a positive correlation between processing plant productivity and vertical
ntegration. And consistent with its predictions, by the mid-1980s, vertical integration
the fraction of mines owned by processing plants) in the East had fallen 28% relative to
he West. 
In both the British beer and US gasoline divorcement episodes, the regulators forced
ivestitures in vertical chains, admittedly because there was an increasing trend in prices
nd the fear was that this was due to foreclosure eﬀects facilitated by vertical integration.
The econometric challenge to identify the eﬀect of divorcement on prices is to con-
rol for the possibility that other factors, such as changes in accounting conventions or
ax rules for the beer industry, contributed to the increase in prices. If the foreclosure
tory was the right one, divorcement should have led to a decrease in prices. If divorce-
ent led to an increase in prices, there is support for an eﬃciency view of integration.
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 Mergers Commission decision to force divestiture of 14,000 public houses. She contrasts 
four types of organization in the vertical chain brewer-pub: company owned, franchised 
pubs with or without ﬁxed fees, and arms-length relationship. Company owned is akin 
to integration, while the two other forms are weak and strong forms of non-integration. 
The upstream segment of the industry was relatively concentrated at the time of 
the decision, with seven large national brewers and a larger number of micro-breweries. 
The divorcement eﬀectively put ceilings on the number of pubs (licenses) that a brewer
could have. The divestitures led to the emergence of public-house chains, which have 
long-term contractual agreements with national brewers, as well as decisions by some 
brewers to stop production and shift to retailing. The main ﬁnding was that following 
the decision, retail prices increased (in the houses closely tied to the brewers, but not in
the free houses), and proﬁts of brewers decreased. Consistent with our results, following 
the policy, some brewers exited the industry. 
Interestingly, some commentators on the beer case (e.g. Spicer et al., 2012 ) note that
demand for pub beer was growing over the decade leading to Beer Orders, due to income
growth and greater leisure time. They also document the strong industry opposition to 
the policy. In terms of our model, the evidence ﬁts the scenario in which collusion was
sustained both before and after the intervention: this accounts for the increased price, the
fallen proﬁts, and the industry opposition. If collusion had b een stopp ed by the policy,
most likely prices would have fallen, at least for a while, as suggested in Section 3.3. If
there had been no collusion, brewers should have welcomed some version of the policy as
a check on their over-investment. 
Barron and Umbeck (1984) studies the eﬀects of the divorcement law enacted in 1974 
in Maryland that prohibited reﬁners’ control of gasoline stations, and reallocated con- 
trol rights for hours of operation and retail pricing to the stations. 13 Contrary to the
beer example, here the reﬁners were not obliged to divest their assets but to move to a
franchising system where the gas station franchisees would have control over operation 
decisions, including the retail price. As in the previous example, the eﬀect of the divorce-
ment has been an increase in retail prices. Barron and Umbeck (1984) cite evidence that
the supporters of the legislation included owners of independent gasoline stations, who 
are indeed likely to gain from the divorcement since price competition will be soften at
the retail level, while opponents to the legislation included, obviously, reﬁners aﬀected 
by the divorcement policy but also consumers . 
These results are consistent with an eﬃciency view of integration, a point that has
been made in many other empirical studies of vertical relationships ( Lafontaine and Slade, 
2007 ), but are especially pertinent for our discussion. A regulator stepped in and forced
divorcement following an upward trend in both retail prices and vertical integration, yet 
prices continued to rise. This is consistent with the view that the pre-divorcement upward
trend in prices was due primarily not to integration but to changes in demand that were
driving both integration and price. 13 See also Barron et al. (1985) ; Slade (1998b ); Vita (2000) and Blass and Carlton (2001) . 
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K  . Conclusion 
One of the challenging tasks in evaluating mergers or the performance of integrated
rms is to disentangle the eﬃciency and market power eﬀects of integration. Our un-
erstanding of the causal relationship between price levels and degrees of integration
ot only guides econometric eﬀorts to separate these eﬀects but also inﬂuences policy
ecisions. In the divorcement episodes discussed here, making allowance in the policy
iscussion for the possibility of demand-driven integration may have led to more satis-
actory outcomes. In terms of our model, a simple cap on integration at then-current
evels would have had the same potential beneﬁt as divorcement in terms of destabilizing
ollusion, but without the damage to ﬁrms’ cost structures that ultimately kept prices
igh. 
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